

They would remake the United States as an incident to remaking the world. For instance, one highly placed official, at a time when crop surpluses were bothering us, came forward with an elaborate scheme for a world corporation which would pool all surpluses everywhere and distribute them to the poor of the world. He actually succeeded in calling a conference of departmental officials to consider his scheme. Another bright young man, who prided himself on the breadth of his views, was going to solve everything by having the United States forcibly guarantee the peace of the world. No one will ever know how many fantastic schemes were in the air. Many of them crossed the border line of sanity, but anyone who attempted to apply elementary common sense was denounced as an obstructionist. It was heresy to assert that two plus two had to equal four.

I had left the Republican Party to support Alfred E. Smith in 1928 because he promised to put into effect the farm program which I had been working on as far back as 1922. I worked for the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt because he seemed to comprehend the farm situation and promised to try to solve it along the lines a group of us had been steadily advocating. I entered what I thought was a Democratic Administration, not because it was Democratic but because it was pledged to a certain course of action. I eventually found that I was not in a Democratic Administration but in a curious collection of socialists and internationalists who were neither Republicans nor Democrats.

They, fanatic-like, believed that their objectives transcended the objectives of ordinary human beings and therefore they could not allow themselves to be hampered by the codes of ordinary mental honesty, by platform pledges, by the Constitution, or by any other of the ordinary rules of human conduct.

There were two broad general groups—the socialists and

the internationalists. The socialists or, more strictly, the collectivists seemed—for nothing was in the open—to be headed by Felix Frankfurter, Rexford G. Tugwell, and Jerome Frank. They gained the mind of the Secretary of Agriculture and had a good deal of sway throughout the Department. The internationalists ruled the State Department and were headed by Secretary Hull and Assistant Secretary Sayre. Those within the groups had many divergent aims. Secretary Wallace, who has an elastic and fantastic mind capable of any stretching, alone managed to be in both groups.

The collectivists tolerated the internationalists and avoided any open clash because the more astute undoubtedly knew that the chief obstacle to a planned and regimented economy in this country is our high standard of living and widespread ownership of property. They must have known that lowering the tariff was the surest method of breaking down the American standard of living by mingling it with the international standard of living. The outstanding and only common characteristic of both groups was their willingness to make the interests of our country and its people subservient to the practice of their theories and to substitute personal government centralized in Washington for our traditional state and local governments. The tactics pursued were unpleasantly reminiscent of those followed in the setting up of totalitarian governments in Russia, Italy and Germany. Both groups have blind spots where the interests of the United States are concerned.

These are serious charges and I do not make them lightly. I intend to prove each point. But first I want to make my relations with the Administration very clear. I entered the Administration on my own terms. I did not want a job or political preferment of any kind. My salary as Administrator of the Agricultural Adjustment Act I turned over to private

counsel whom I retained to advise me independently of the A.A.A. counsel—in whom I had no confidence.

The Agricultural Adjustment Act was a hodgepodge of conflicting notions compromised into a bill which had to be passed in order to get action. In supporting the Act, I thought that it would be used for constructive purposes and I did not have the slightest idea that in its administration it would become principally an instrument to regiment the farmer through acreage control. I had not the slightest idea that it would not be used for the purposes which through the years we had discussed—to open our foreign markets, to sell our surpluses, to improve distribution at home and to pay proper benefits independently of acreage control. I thought that before taking office I had made my views abundantly clear. I have no doubt now but that I did. But others had other views—and they were willing to wait until they could make them prevail.

Through all my life I have been steadfastly against the promotion of planned scarcity. On this point Secretary Wallace and I disagreed sharply while the bill was in the making. That I shall take up in detail in a later section. The point of importance now is my understanding with the President as a condition precedent to taking office. Here are some entries from my diary for April 5th, 1933—the Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed on May 12th.

I talked with Wallace. I told him I was going up to the Hill for a while (meaning Senator Smith's Office, to review my testimony). Upon arrival at Senator Smith's office a messenger from the Secretary's office came for me and said the Secretary wanted me to come to the Department right away, which I did. He said the President wanted us to come to the White House at 4:15, and asked what my answer would be to the President. I told him that depended upon the President's decision as to policy, which I would discuss in our interview. We spent twenty minutes with the President, who asked me if